NATO Should Stay Out of Iran

Never one for consistent messaging about foreign policy, President Donald Trump’s position on needing assistance in the Persian Gulf for its war of choice on Iran has gotten ever more confused as the conflict sinks into an extended stalemate. The President’s position is explicitly that the US does not need help from its European allies to re-open the Strait of Hormuz, and that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is the “last person” the US needs help with in dealing with Iranian drones—largely the same class of weapons that have been pummeling Ukrainian cities for years now. Despite these assurances, however, the Strait of Hormuz—through which a hefty portion of the world’s hydrocarbon fuels passes—remains closed, and during the shooting war with Iran, a great many US bases and allied infrastructure objects suffered damage from Iranian missiles and drones.

Perhaps this is why the President has shifted to blaming and punishing Europeans who did not offer the help he insisted he did not need. The first lever he seems to be reaching for is the removal of US troops from European bases—pulling 5000 troops from Germany and threatening to withdraw more, especially from countries like Spain that have objected to the US attacks on Iran. Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt put it most bluntly with regard to NATO—in the President’s view, “They were tested, and they failed.” However, even opponents of the war seem to think it wise to make it into a transatlantic crusade. Thomas Friedman was in the New York Times May 12 practically begging European NATO states to bail the US out of a situation he admits we have no plan for getting out of.

This view is foolish. Dragging NATO into Iran, or making American participation in NATO contingent on action in Iran, threatens to erode the basics that make NATO functional in the first place. And European NATO states (and Canada) would be foolish to give in to this petulance—there is no formal understanding, ethical motivation, or even pragmatic consideration that would obligate or even argue in favor of Europe joining this American misadventure.

If the Iran war is a test for NATO, it is a test of whether the alliance can retain a defined mission, or whether it will be subjected to perpetual mission creep. In the latter case, it cannot possibly survive. There is no question whether either the text of the North Atlantic Treaty or even precedent entails that NATO countries are obligated to support the US in Iran. The famous Article 5 of NATO, invoked only once (after the September 11 attacks), reads the “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” But Article 6 provides more detailed explanation:

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Of course, the combat in the Persian Gulf began with American attacks against Iran, so a mutual defense treaty cannot reasonably extend to include them. But geography also militates against European involvement in Iran—the treaty is quite specific in including vessels in the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. But the Strait of Hormuz of course opens into the Indian Ocean.

This is not a mere technicality, but rather a rule that has been observed in practice repeatedly. The US did not call upon NATO after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, since it occurred in the Pacific, nor did the UK invoke Article 5 to defend the Falklands, being as they are in the South Atlantic. The geographic focus of NATO is one of the reasons the treaty has lasted so long. Despite the far-flung conflicts of its constituent states (especially the US, France, UK, and Portugal), the alliance retained a focus on areas core to all of them. Dragging West Germans to Goa or the Norwegian Navy into the Falklands war would have dispersed and weakened the alliance—and bringing those forces into the Persian Gulf, under such controversial circumstances, would doubtless have the same effect.

Perhaps the most analogous case is the Suez Canal crisis of the 1950s—so similar as to merit dubbing the present predicament #StupidSuez. Here again NATO was not obligated to intervene, as in that event it was France and the UK that worked in concert with Israel to launch an attack against Egypt, not the other way around. Indeed, Suez displays another potential value of the limited alliance—it can pull wayward members back from the brink. Far from backing his Cold War allies to the hilt, Eisenhower wisely pressured France and Britain to pull back from their seizure of the canal.

This is why liberals generally prefer broader multilateralism to unilateral action or narrow ‘coalitions of the willing.’ Multilateralism is preferred not simply on the theory that ‘many hands make light work’ or that broad agreement among countries can make a policy right or wrong, wise or foolish. Rather, there is reason to prefer a multilateral approach because it is generally true that a broader variety of national perspectives is more likely to lead to a strong strategy. A few months before the UK seized the Suez Canal, Eisenhower communicated to British Prime Minister Anthony Eden “I have given you my personal conviction, as well as that of my associates, as to the unwisdom even of contemplating the use of military force at this moment.” Unfortunately, the British government did not take Eisenhower’s advice. But the lack of American support forced a quicker end to the conflict, and quite possibly saved Britain, France, and Israel from a much deeper quagmire with more dangerous consequences (particularly had the USSR gotten more closely involved). 

Yet the United States similarly seems determined to ignore the advice of Pedro Sanchez, Friedrich Merz, and other cooler heads within NATO. It is those leaders who are on the right side of international law, and maintaining that position will in the long run improve the position of NATO and their own countries in the realm of global opinion. By contrast, NATO ‘solidarity’ in following American belligerence would have the effect Eisenhower warned about with regard to Suez: a broad demonstration to the rest of the world of Euro-American refusal to obey international law or norms. If the US succeeds in dragging Europe into an unwinnable conflict in Iran, it will have seriously weakened the NATO alliance and the position of some of its most reliable allies.

On the other hand, if the US continues in its efforts to compel behavior by European NATO states but is unsuccessful, the results will also be negative for both parties. President Trump imagines his removal of American troops to be punishing European states, and indeed a reduced American military presence will likely force European states to incur a greater financial burden in holding the eastern flank of NATO. However, unraveling NATO over an issue far outside the North Atlantic region runs long term risks for the United States as well. For example, the US has decided, rightly or wrongly, that it is important to limit China’s access to the most advanced computer chip making equipment. The US is currently able to do this only because the largest manufacturer of this equipment, ASML, is headquartered in the Netherlands, a US ally and important trading partner, and thus the US has been able to instruct ASML on what it can and cannot sell to China. However, at some point, demands from the US that American friendship requires unconditional support for even the most blatantly illegal and ill-conceived military adventures will fray these bonds and leave the US with less leverage when it needs cooperation from Europe.

And this fraying is much more likely than European states conceding to US demands, because even a sharp diplomatic break with the US would be wiser than acquiescence at this point. Domestically, European states are experiencing the same swing in opinions about Israel as the US is—a swing into sharply negative territory. Given Israel’s role as America’s most prominent co-belligerent in the conflict, it would be politically disastrous for most European leaders to voluntarily side with Israel in a broadly unpopular and likely expensive conflict.

There are two directions US policy can go after the current presidency.  If the US returns to a more ‘normal’ set of diplomatic goals, it will almost certainly be under a Democratic president. In such a case, European allies who stood up to Trump will likely be appreciated. Alternately, the US could continue its current trajectory—tariffs, unilateral belligerence, and general hostility to liberal states like most of those in the EU. In that case, European NATO states should start now in finding alternate allies and partners. Acting as a ‘ride or die’ for the US today would make this goal almost impossible tomorrow. It is thus imperative that the rest of NATO resist following the US into this conflict, whatever the pressure brought to bear, and that liberals in the United States do what we can to oppose our government in applying that pressure and expanding the war. 

Featured image is "Flag of NATO," NATO 1953.