The Future of Brazil's Fight Against Neofascism

With a margin of 3.58 percentage points, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won the Brazilian presidential election for the fourth time. For the first time in the country’s history, the second-round result reversed the first-round result, in which Flávio Bolsonaro had led by a margin of 1.87 percentage points.

But this victory, undoubtedly historic, took place against a significantly adverse backdrop, as the elections for governors, deputies, and senators were won mostly by candidates from the right and the far right. Jair Bolsonaro’s wife and two of his children, along with numerous allies, were elected to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. This is a key point for understanding what lies ahead for Brazil in the coming years.

Now, with the Workers’ Party’s latest victory, what is already being called the “third round” is beginning—the period between the elections and the new government’s inauguration, scheduled for January 5, 2027. This period, which was not a feature of Brazilian politics before the rise of Bolsonarism, is marked by high tension, accusations of fraud by Bolsonarists, and a significant risk of street violence. After the 2022 elections, there were encampments outside military barracks across the country, with calls for military intervention, as well as roadblocks. All of this culminated in the coup attempt on January 8, 2023. While Flávio Bolsonaro has left Brazil and his party has conceded, this is no guarantee of future tranquility.

The results of the elections for deputies and senators are also a factor that will influence—if not determine—what will happen over the next four years in Brazil and, indirectly, in Latin America and the world. Lula’s victory mattered, and has averted the worst outcomes. But neofascism has not been defeated in Brazil.

The Brazilian political landscape

The Brazilian Senate consists of 81 senators, each serving an eight-year term. Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) will hold 10 of these seats, while Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) will have 29 senators. Here, an important clarification is needed: in Brazil, the term “liberal” is often used to refer to advocates of economic liberalism and is associated primarily with the right, and in recent years also with the far right.

Thus, the Senate will consist of 34 centrist senators, 31 from the right, 15 from the left, and one independent senator. In Brazil, the center, known as the Centrão, has historically tended to vote with the right. In the Chamber of Deputies, the breakdown will be 257 deputies from "center" parties, 132 from the right, and 124 from the left, with a similar tendency for the center to align with the right.

But there are two key characteristics in the profiles of many far-right lawmakers: their role as social media influencers and their use of hate as a political tool. This combination has allowed lawmakers such as Eduarda Campopiano and Lucas Pavanato—both Bolsonaro supporters—to win substantial numbers of votes, even without presenting coherent policy proposals. Their rhetoric focuses primarily on anti-feminism and transphobia. The language and tactics of the far right are increasingly shared worldwide.

“I owe feminism NOTHING. No woman does,” wrote Campopiano on X in 2021. Five years later, at just 23, she became the most-voted candidate for São Paulo’s state assembly, receiving nearly 1.95 million votes in the 2026 election. She has described herself as the greatest enemy of feminists in São Paulo.

With both houses of Congress composed in this way, Lula’s efforts are likely to face obstacles, particularly regarding initiatives related to labor legislation, social rights, and environmental policies. To govern, the federal government will need to negotiate with right-wing parties and the Centrão to pass bills, which may require budgetary concessions, appointments, and changes to the content of the proposals.

At the same time, the use of social media to mobilize support through disinformation and the creation of scapegoats is likely to continue, as seen in the 2018 presidential campaign, when Jair Bolsonaro and his allies spread false claims that the Workers’ Party planned to distribute a “gay kit” to encourage children as young as 6 to become gay. The material was actually intended for teachers working with students aged 11 and older and aimed to promote respect for LGBTQ+ people and prevent discrimination.

Big Tech interference

From the start of the election campaign, it was evident that Flávio Bolsonaro was being favored on social media, specifically on Meta’s platforms. Posts about Lula had their reach restricted, ad accounts were deactivated—including the president’s own—and Meta’s artificial intelligence refused to generate campaign images for Lula. On the pro-Bolsonaro side, such difficulties seemed not to exist.

Posts containing all kinds of misinformation circulated and were amplified by pro-Bolsonaro accounts. Among the topics were alleged tampering with electronic voting machines, the closure of churches under a new Lula administration, and the destruction of public property during rallies in support of the president. In addition, videos featuring Bolsonaro’s campaign proposals were boosted, unlike Lula’s campaign materials.

To address this problem, during the second-round campaign, Congressman André Janones organized massive social media campaigns, including the use of hashtags, the coordinated posting of content at specific times, and the organization of street protests. These and other strategies increased the circulation of campaign materials and helped overcome the challenges faced on Meta’s platforms.

But most importantly, this process highlighted not only the power that big tech companies wield, but also the possibility of countering their influence on public debate.

There are already proposals in the National Congress to regulate social media and other internet companies. In light of the election results and what transpired during the campaign, pressure is mounting for these proposals to be put to a vote and implemented.

Class struggle and social progress 

Lula’s main campaign promises, dating back to his first election, have included improving the quality of life for the working class and minorities. As Lula was an industrial worker in his youth, the class struggle has always been a central theme in his rhetoric and is key to mobilizing his voters.

Between 2018 and 2022, under Jair Bolsonaro’s administration, the increase in the minimum wage did not outpace inflation and did not result in real gains in purchasing power. In contrast, during Lula’s three terms in office, these increases always resulted in real improvements. For 2027, the president has already mandated a 7.4% increase, which is above the inflation rate.

Toward the end of his third term, another struggle took to the streets: the fight to end the 6x1 work schedule, under which workers labor six days a week and are allowed one day off. The campaign was driven by a popular mobilization and brought before Congress by lawmakers from the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL), an ally of the Lula administration with strong ties to sectors of the working class. Congress’s approval of the end of the 6x1 work schedule in October 2026 represented a victory for workers’ mobilization for better living conditions and a reduction in working hours.

This was a crucial issue during the second-round campaign, as there were expectations that Flávio Bolsonaro would replace the end of the 6x1 work schedule with a flexible work model, with payment per hour worked and wages and benefits proportional to the hours worked. This would represent a major loss for the working class and played a heavy role in swaying votes.

The second pillar of Lula’s campaign promises relates to minorities and includes different areas of focus. Upon taking office in 2023, Lula ordered the creation of the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples, aimed at a group that has historically been marginalized and severely affected by the Bolsonaro administration’s policies. He also reestablished the Ministry of Women, which under the Bolsonaro administration had been merged into the Ministry of Women, Family, and Human Rights. In addition, Lula increased funds for affordable housing, education, and public health programs.

For his fourth term, the expectation is that the newly created ministries will be maintained and social programs expanded. The level of popular mobilization seen during the second turn campaign, if sustained, is likely to counterbalance the right-wing composition of Congress and the Senate and help protect hard-won rights. 

Whether that mobilization can be sustained in the face of right-wing pressure, on the other hand, is less sure. The far right openly defends the removal of labor protections, women’s rights, and the rights of minorities. These are political projects aimed at reversing rights won through decades of struggle. No right is irreversible, and every gain can be undone if those who fought for it fail to defend it.

The new face of South America

In South America, right-wing governments clearly outnumber left-wing ones, with the only exceptions being Brazil, Uruguay, Suriname, and Guyana—although the latter two do not wield significant local influence. I do not include Venezuela on this list because, although Delcy Rodríguez—Nicolás Maduro’s vice president—is officially the president, there is de facto U.S. control over the country, or at least in a wide range of matters.

The leading figures on the right in South America are Javier Milei of Argentina and Antonio Kast of Chile. Both support Donald Trump, although a closer look suggests something closer to personal devotion.

This shift is reflected in what is called the U.S. sphere of influence—an expansion of what Trump calls “the Donroe Doctrine.” With such influence over countries surrounding Brazil, diplomatic pressure on Lula is mounting. An international environment which favors the far right cannot be ignored. Eduardo Bolsonaro, one of the former president’s sons and a federal deputy at the time, abandoned his post in March 2025 to lobby the Trump administration against his own country, supporting tariffs and sanctions against Brazil. By contrast, in 2024 the Biden administration pressured Brazilian generals not to side with Bolsonaro’s attempted coup. With Trump in the White House, the pressure may run in the other direction. Already, Flávio Bolsonaro has fled Brazil for the United States; what may come of this is not yet known.

The challenges of Lula’s fourth term

It is undeniable that Lula’s fourth term, with a National Congress dominated by the right and the far right, will be contentious to say the least. Even so, the sense of relief following his election is palpable. The prospect of a far-right government with no checks and balances in Congress was terrifying for minorities, retirees, and working families.

Jair Bolsonaro’s administration, from 2019 to 2022, demonstrated the damage caused by the dismantling of the public sector and the social impact of hate speech. We are still suffering the consequences of such rhetoric, which often escalates into threats and physical assaults. In this final week of the campaign, a Lula supporter was shot and killed by a Bolsonaro supporter in Mato Grosso do Sul; people were struck by vehicles driven by Bolsonaro supporters during marches; and Workers’ Party city councilwoman Iara Pimentel was struck by a brick during a demonstration.

Given what happened after Jair Bolsonaro’s defeat at the polls in 2022, it is expected that violence, both verbal and physical, will continue.

As Brazilian journalist Vivian Mesquita said, “Let’s not fool ourselves—we still have a fight ahead of us.”

Featured Image is Lula, presidente eleito, discursa na Paulista, from the Lula official account