Stand on Principle: Impeach Trump

Congress should impeach Donald Trump not for reason of political strategy, but because law and principle demand it.

Stand on Principle: Impeach Trump

The Democratic Party’s resounding victory in the midterm elections has made the question of whether or not to impeach President Donald Trump suddenly relevant again. And it seems as though a conventional wisdom is developing that Democrats should not impeach Trump, but should instead impeach his various subordinates. Shortly before the midterms, former Vice President Kamala Harris suggested in an interview that congressional Democrats should not move toward impeachment. Instead, their “limited resources” should be spent on other things, like accountability and investigations (a rather strange juxtaposition, if you ask me).

Meanwhile, there is serious talk of impeaching Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Most recently, Kentucky Republican Thomas Massie filed articles of impeachment against Hegseth on November 9, for offenses ranging from the war in Iran to the kidnapping of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro to the strikes on random fishing boats in the Caribbean. Massie’s impeachment resolution was tabled the following day, but every Democrat voted to proceed with the impeachment, and it seems more than likely that the Democrats will in fact impeach Hegseth when they take control of the House in January. Presumptive future Speaker of the House Hakeem Jeffries, who has been less than enthusiastic about the idea of impeaching Trump, described himself as a “hard yes” on going after Hegseth. 

All of this seems to reflect a view among congressional Democrats that the two impeachments of Trump’s first term backfired, and that impeaching him again would likely do the same. The common narrative is that impeaching Trump for his extortion of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy only served to rally Trump’s base and consolidate support. Notwithstanding the Democrats’ sweeping midterm victory, they will have only 56 Senate seats in January, far short of the 67 required to convict on an impeachment charge. Assuming Republicans stand by Trump, as they have done so far, impeaching him yet again would serve no practical function.

Hegseth, on the other hand, is thought to be quite unpopular among congressional Republicans. There is some thought he might actually be convicted. And in any event he is a safer target: he is not Trump, and does not have Trump’s legions of diehard fans who might be activated by the threat of another Trump impeachment. 

Now I am skeptical of the arguments for why impeaching Trump again would be poor political strategy. The idea that the first impeachment in 2019 boosted Trump politically is not well supported; you cannot really spot the impeachment trial in the graph of his approval ratings. But my point here is not to engage with the question of strategy on its own terms. Quite the contrary: the reason why the incoming Democratic Congress should impeach Donald Trump for high crimes and misdemeanors, in my view, is just because he is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors. They should impeach Trump because it is what law and principle demand of them, what their oaths to the Constitution demand of them.

We are so well accustomed to debating the nuances of impeachment strategy that this idea can sound hopelessly naïve. Of course impeachment is a matter of political advantage first and foremost; what else would it be? In any event the whole notion that “law” and “principle” might demand impeachment sounds silly to those who follow Gerald Ford’s maxim that an “impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history.” I have never subscribed to Ford’s view, however, for reasons I have articulated elsewhere.

No, the Constitution does not prescribe in detail what counts as a “high crime or misdemeanor.” But this is true of almost every substantive phrase in the Constitution. The way we determine their meaning is through all the usual techniques of legal argumentation, and these are no less useful in the impeachment context than anywhere else. In any event, this open-ended phrase is only one of the grounds for impeachment: Trump has certainly committed the specific offense of bribery throughout his second term, and in my view he committed treason on January 6, 2021. There is really no doubt that, as a matter of law, he is guilty of impeachable offenses, crimes of the highest order.

Furthermore, although this way of thinking may be unfashionable, the Constitution does not really leave much doubt that impeachment is meant to be a matter of principle. Article I, Section 3 specifies that, when Senators sit to try impeachments, they must take a special oath; by convention, this is an oath to “do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws.” Granted, the House swears no such special oath, but its members all do swear the basic oath to “support and defend the Constitution,” per Article VI, Clause 3 (and 5 U.S.C. § 3331). In his influential Handbook on impeachment, Charles Black wrote that impeachment “resembles the judicial criminal process in that it is confided by the Constitution to responsible tribunals—the House of Representatives and the Senate—and in that these bodies are duty-bound to act on their views of the law and the facts, as free as may be of partisan political motives and pressures.”

For this reason, he suggested that the role of the citizen in the process should primarily be one of “vigilant waiting,” that “a snow of telegrams ought to play no part.” Like the members of Congress actually participating, we should strive for a “stance of principled political neutrality,” and that we should constantly “ask ourselves whether we would have answered the same question the same way if it came up with respect to a president toward whom we felt oppositely from the way we feel toward the president threatened with removal.”

Now, Black was writing in 1974, when Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal made the nation consider presidential impeachment for the first time in a century. It was a more innocent age: today the idea that impeachment could be totally insulated from popular politics is a fantasy. Black was hardly oblivious to the difficulties of expecting the Senate, an elected, political body, to act with “total impartiality, at least resembling that of a faithful judge or juror.” But his solution to the problem was rather more plausible in 1974 than it is today:

The remedy has to be in the conscience of each senator, who ought to realize the danger and try as far as possible to divest himself of all prejudice. I see no reason why this cannot produce a satisfactory result.

Similarly, Black suggested that, although the Senate trial must surely be open to the public, there was no place for “radio, television, and cameras.” Television coverage in particular was undesirable, for it “maximizes the chances of development of public pressure for some given result.” Instead, the “judgment of the public ought to come after the fact, on sober and long consideration of a record which will remain accessible forever.” It is no longer possible to read this passage without bitter laughter, not because he was wrong but because that fight has long since been lost. (Similarly his claim that the “taking…of public opinion polls on guilt or innocence, should be looked on as an unspeakable indecency.”)

His fundamental point has not changed, though. To the greatest extent possible, impeachment is not meant to be a partisan matter. That this has become more difficult in our modern age, as television coverage and polling have become unavoidable, in no way changes the basic obligation under the Constitution. When they act as part of the impeachment process, members of Congress ought not to act as members of their political parties at all. Their sole responsibility is to the nation, to the Constitution, to the truth.

We condemn the Republican Senators who voted to acquit Trump in his first-term impeachment trials precisely because they were derelict in this duty. They forsook their oaths out of partisan loyalty. But if this behavior is to be deplored in Republicans, it must not be tolerated in Democrats either. To be clear, this does not imply that the Democrats who have voted to impeach Trump, on an essentially party-line basis, are doing anything wrong: Trump really is guilty of high crimes, today as in 2019 and in 2021. Instead, perversely, the danger is that Democrats, like Republicans, will stay their hand against Trump because they perceive that to be in their partisan political interest. It is no more defensible for us to do that than it is for them.

Now in 2019, when the Democrats took control of the House of Representatives after Trump’s first two years in office, there was an argument to be made that they had to consider questions of political strategy because the survival of the Republic was on the line. Trump was seeking then, as he is still seeking today, to make himself the tyrant of America. If he had won re-election in 2020, there is every chance he would have succeeded.

Therefore, defending the Constitution meant doing whatever made it most likely that Trump would actually leave power. Unlike in 1974, when Senate Republicans were finally convinced of Nixon’s criminality and abandoned him, leading to his resignation, there was no actual prospect of ousting Trump through impeachment. Thus, it was appropriate to take a realpolitik view of impeachment, to pursue it only if that seemed likely to help beat Trump at the next election. The argument is reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln’s argument for suspending habeas corpus during the early days of the Civil War: “Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?”

But here’s the thing. Democrats just won the biggest landslide in forty years. This wasn’t some strange fluke: special election results all through the last two years have shown similar results. Trump is hideously unpopular, as a result of which the Democrats have the biggest congressional majorities in decades (since 2010 in the Senate, and 1992 in the House), as well as a comfortable majority of the nation’s governorships. It seems, if not certain, then at least very likely that Democrats will win the 2028 presidential election, and quite likely by a sizable margin. Moreover, Trump himself is term-limited by the Twenty-Second Amendment. Although he has made jokes about seeking an illegal third term, it is hard to see him pulling that off from such a weak political position. There is no very strong justification, in other words, for betraying the Constitution in order to save it. We are in a stronger position than that; we can afford to stand on principle, and therefore we are obliged to.

It is also worth considering the cost of not taking a principled stance on these matters. The behavior of political leaders serves as a model for the citizenry. That we find the very suggestion that Congress ought to act with principle in matters of impeachment, as Black described back in 1974, is surely related to the fact that it utterly failed to do so in 1998 and in 2019 and in 2021. It may have been justifiable for House Democrats to behave strategically in 2019, for the reasons just mentioned. But it still helped to teach the public that honor and principle are for fools. Both parties, after all, were openly allowing political calculus to govern their approach to impeachment.

The same strategic caution in 2019 may have helped to normalize Trump’s rampant criminality, for although the House did impeach Trump over Ukraine and over January 6, it left scores if not hundreds of impeachable offenses unprosecuted—most conspicuously, the matter covered in the famous report of special counsel Robert Mueller, which was about as close to an express recommendation of impeachment as it could be without using the word itself. It is all too easy for a member of the public to draw the inference that, if even the Democratic opposition did not think the Mueller Report worth impeaching Trump for, then his behavior cannot really have been all that bad.

What, then, would be the lesson taught by staying our hand this time around? In particular, what would be the lesson of impeaching Hegseth and other underlings but not Trump himself? The history of impeachment is instructive here. The American impeachment process is modeled on a much older British practice. And in the British context, Parliament used impeachment almost exclusively against ministers who can be considered analogous to someone like Hegseth: executive officers, but not the chief executive.

There was, however, one very specific reason for this: the chief executive was the King. And Parliament could not go at the King directly. Indeed, it could be considered treasonous even to criticize the King’s actions. Opposition to government policy therefore had to find a safer outlet, and impeachment of the King’s ministers provided just such an outlet. This allowed Parliament to effect a change in policy while remaining loyal to the Crown. Indeed, by locating the fault in some minister who could be sacked, impeachment helped to absolve the Crown of wrongdoing.

Our Impeachment Clause, however, expressly makes our chief executive subject to impeachment. Viewed in light of the British history, stating that the “President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States” are subject to impeachment can be understood as a pointed declaration that the President is not a king. Indeed, in our country there is no tradition of using impeachment against lesser executive officers. The House has only approved articles of impeachment against any lesser executive officer twice in its entire history, once in 1876 when Secretary of War William Worth Belknap was found to have taken bribes and once in 2024 when the Republican House impeached Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas. (Their true grievance was with President Joe Biden, whose immigration policies they evidently thought unlawful and impeachable; I have always thought it was an act of unprincipled cowardice on their part to impeach Mayorkas instead of Biden himself.)

As Harry Truman famously said, the buck stops here: the President bears final responsibility for everything the government does. Ordinarily, then, when a Cabinet officer has behaved scandalously, the President will demand their resignation. If they did not, if they stood by their subordinate, then Congress might properly impeach the President for what that subordinate had done. 

Impeaching Hegseth but not Trump, then, sends the message that Trump is our king. That his right to rule cannot be questioned; that, as in seventeenth-century Britain, our opposition must find a safer outlet, must remain loyal to the Crown. This is unbecoming of a free republic, and would be a gross betrayal of the millions who turned out to protest against Trump under the slogan “No Kings.” Now this is not to say that we should not impeach Hegseth, or any of the other rogues in Trump’s gallery. Hegseth is certainly guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, as Massie’s articles of impeachment make clear.

That he was merely implementing Trump’s policies does not absolve him of culpability: if the president orders you to commit a high crime, your duty is to refuse and/or resign. And although in the ordinary case there is no need to impeach a Cabinet officer instead of pressuring them to resign, impeachment does offer one function above and beyond mere removal from office: the convicted party can also be barred from holding future office. Trump’s underlings arguably deserve that fate, as he himself surely does. For that reason alone, it is proper to go through the formal mechanics of impeaching each of them individually. But this cannot be a substitute for impeaching Trump himself. 


Featured Image is Nixon's farewell to his cabinet and members of the White House staff, by Oliver F. Atkins

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