The Drug War Is Not Judged by Whether It Works
The Trump administration's supply-side counternarcotics policy runs on the logic of escalation.
The Trump administration's supply-side counternarcotics policy runs on the logic of escalation.
Over the past 14 months, the Trump administration has bombed dozens of boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, killing more than 240 people. On October 13, more than a year into the campaign, the Wall Street Journal reported the result: record amounts of cocaine are still reaching the United States, Europe, and even Australia, the cheapest and purest it’s been in decades.
The political leaders who endorse this and other escalations in supply-side counternarcotics policy have adopted as their motto: “We do bad things to bad people.”
In fact, these militant interventions come at extraordinary cost but achieve less than nothing. Research on drug trafficking (regardless of the drug) shows that traffickers responding to more conventional tactics of interdiction often find new and better ways of doing business. The Wall Street Journal just documented those countermeasures in real time.
The drug war is worse than futile; it accelerates undesirable changes in drug trafficking. Yet policy and debate remain unaffected by these findings. Although the recent tactics of the Trump administration have attracted critics who urge more restraint, few dispute the overall strategy of interdiction and seizures. These “reasonable” experts advocate the same strategy, just modified and pursued with less overt bloodlust.
Not only does this seemingly reasonable approach fail to account for research that shows drug traffickers to be networked and highly adaptive, but it also places drug policy on the path of escalating applications of force.
The reason for this is simple: the drug war is not judged by whether it works. The collection of militant supply-side policies that we think of as the drug war—eradication, arrest and punishment, and drug interdiction and seizures—has not been authorized or evaluated according to whether those policies affect drug supply, the outcome that matters most to ordinary Americans. In fact, the government’s own audits are very clear on this failing, quietly pointing out that these costly interventions have not been asked to demonstrate real-world effects on the drugs sold on the streets.
As a result, the application of force without accountability to meaningful outcomes means that policy runs on, and rewards, the logic of escalation. If you are willing to send armed police or soldiers, why not an armed drone? If you want to build a fence, why not a wall? Once force is accepted as an end in itself, restraint and protocol look like half-hearted measures from those lacking in courage. These perverse policy incentives allow Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to mask incompetence as conviction: “Taking the gloves off” is his approach, and “kill everybody” is his command.
The real counter to the Trump administration’s drug war is the one we apply elsewhere in American policy: does it work?
Posing this question has never been more important. Supply-side counternarcotics policy remains locked in a militant strategy, often premised on a “kingpin” or hierarchical notion of drug cartels that does not match the reality of how these drugs are made and moved.
More change is coming. In the new age of synthetic and extremely potent drugs concocted in laboratories—a change so transformative some analysts call it "Drugs 2.0"—the stakes are even higher. Analysts at InSight Crime note that laboratories manufacturing entirely synthetic drugs work as subcontractors or independent operations, can be readily replaced, and, given their small size, remain essentially impossible to map. Meanwhile, the drugs these labs produce drive overdose deaths to unimaginable heights.
What matters most in this fast-paced market of street drugs is not bad guys with guns but the governments that tolerate lapses in their own competence, particularly in the regulation and importation of chemicals on which the diverse, diffuse, and high-velocity world of "Drugs 2.0" relies.
All countries with large-scale drug trafficking share identifiable failures of governance. These include allowing “analogues” that are similar to prohibited drugs to slip through cracks and selling dangerous drugs or their precursors without “know-your-customer” provisions. Any country lacking these regulations or meaningful enforcement of them is susceptible to large-scale traffic in illegal drugs.
Criminal organizations may exploit these failures of governance—but they are a symptom, not the cause. If a country has cartels, it has a drug-trafficking problem, but not every country with a drug-trafficking problem has cartels. As the example of Colombia demonstrates, it is possible to traffic in drugs that kill Americans without cartels, kingpins, assassinations, or car bombs.
It stands to reason that if governance is the problem, then governments should be the targets of supply-side counternarcotics policy.
Adopting the appropriate target moves drug policy in the right direction, but it also raises a new set of problems. After all, the economic and diplomatic sanctions that replace militant supply-side counternarcotics policy are often held hostage to other imperatives of foreign policy. To address this difficulty, I wrote a white paper with the Niskanen Center that argued for “border adjustments,” sanctions based on calculated harm and imposed without fear or favor, with escalation and relief tied to measurable outcomes like drug prices, purity and overdose deaths—and not an administration’s mood.
Others may have different ideas. What is most important, at this point, is to judge supply-side counternarcotics policy based on results.
Doing so would restore the application of force as a means to an end, not an end in itself. Nothing is more urgent after decades of unprecedented expansion in punishment and surveillance, a form of American exceptionalism which I call the “security Leviathan”: an empire of force and detention that threatens the vision of republican governance espoused by the country’s founders.
We get the policy results for which we design and measure and the world for which we build. In the case of drug policy, the United States has built for vengeance and pursued it regardless of the cost. These blunt realities tell a different story than we hear from the lips of the Trump administration—or from its critics.
As terror rains down from the sky, we should admit that we do not do bad things to bad people. We “do” bad policy to get bad results—and, in the case of the drug war, we have been in that business for a very long time.
Featured image is "Secretary of War Pete Hegseth delivers remarks to U.S. service members at San Juan International Airport, Puerto Rico, Sept. 8, 2025," Aiko Bongolan 2025.
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