Is Equality Enough?
Isabella Weber’s “Anti-Fascist Economics” offers a compelling toolkit for our economic woes. But the roots of fascism run deeper than the merely material.
Isabella Weber’s “Anti-Fascist Economics” offers a compelling toolkit for our economic woes. But the roots of fascism run deeper than the merely material.
It’s been a good time for accessible yet rigorous analyses of our fascist moment. Naomi Klein and Astra Taylor’s End Times Fascism provided a top-level view, Gil Duran’s The Nerd Reich and Adam Becker’s More Everything Forever a focus on the tech industry that is often at the heart of whatever fuckery is happening on a given day. Isabella Weber’s Anti-Fascist Economics is part of this wave and, thanks to Weber’s deep knowledge of economics and willingness to suggest heterodox yet ultimately workable solutions, one that is markedly more practical than many similar books.
If you have heard the term ‘greedflation’ then you have Weber to thank. Her economic work tackles a very fundamental and relatable question: why is everything so expensive? The answer is simple, but goes to the heart of our economic system: businesses have used exogenous events like the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and now the war in Iran to increase prices far beyond what could be justified by simply covering their increased costs. The fact that oil companies are doubling their earnings while the product they sell is trapped in the Strait of Hormuz is ample proof of this. She has been called the “most hated woman in economics” after penning a 2021 column in The Guardian calling for strategic price controls to reverse greedflation. Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman called it “truly stupid”—he deleted the post and apologised for his language, but did not change his argument. In the years since, more economists and politicians have come around to Weber’s thinking. This mainstream acceptance has led to multiple awards and a position on an expert committee to advise the German government on its rules for public debt.
As Weber points out, anti-fascism was once a major concern of economists. President Roosevelt, corresponding with John Maynard Keynes, was conscious that fascism was ascendant in Europe and a possibility in the United States when he created the New Deal. The Business Plot failed and the Silver Shirts remain a historical footnote because, in Weber’s telling, the “relief, recovery and reform” Roosevelt put in place prevented the kind of mass dissatisfaction one saw in Germany, where the ‘hunger chancellor’ Heinrich Brüning’s response to the Great Depression drove food shortages and mass unemployment, ultimately leading to Nazism. This is one data point amongst the many Weber uses to make her case, but her overall argument is simple: to prevent fascism from returning, to ensure ‘never again,’ we must ensure affordability and dignity through economic interventions. Weber’s policy recommendations, like Universal Basic Services and price controls, would bring millions into equality with each other, creating a hard floor below which nobody could fall.
But is it enough to prevent the rise of fascism in our time? Beginning in 1965, government-aligned forces in Indonesia would kill a million or more human beings. This slaughter occurred under an authoritarian, illiberal quasi-democracy, and was nominally aimed at the extirpation of communism. Yet the Indonesian genocide was not instigated by famine or mass unemployment but ideology. Imperial Japan significantly reduced economic damage from the Great Depression through what were essentially Keynesian policies, returning to positive growth by 1930. They used this economic advantage to arm themselves for one of the most brutal wars of the period when they invaded China. And of course democratic countries can and do commit atrocities on a vast scale: the 1943 Bengal Famine may have killed as many as three million Indians while the country that engineered it fought Nazism.
For a more contemporary example, consider Elon Musk, who appears throughout Anti-Fascist Economics and extensively in any anti-fascist book published today, with good reason. He is undoubtedly the most influential fascist to appear on the world stage since the Second World War, but despite his deep ties to the government and the Trump White House in particular and his temporary post at DOGE, he is not a politician. He and a group of smirking teenage boys were able to commit a world-historical atrocity that will claim the lives of an estimated 14 million people over the next four years because they were temporarily handed power within a flawed democracy. No March on Rome was needed; the consent of the population was never sought; it just happened.
Even with a body count that places him among history’s worst monsters, Musk’s legacy may be his influence over the affective elements of what Weber terms “the fascist virus.” Like any virus, the fascist virus comes in many strains, some more malignant than others, and part of the function of X.com is to increase that malignancy by providing frameworks within which fascism can be enjoyed. Weber is right to posit a causal relationship between economic anxiety and support for authoritarianism, but there are complexities that need to be examined, and they often aren’t economic but psychological.
We can split fascists into two groups: the first are the know-nothings one sees in New York Times ‘ask a Trump voter’ articles. They are usually viciously reactionary, with ‘immigration’ (that is, the presence of non-white people) as a major focus, but as voting patterns show they can be persuaded to stay home on election day, if not cross the aisle, by material factors. These are the people that Weber can reach with her economic prescriptions that focus on affordability and dignity. Then there are the core fascists, the creeps—sweaty, pale, awkward “Lovecraft in Brooklyn” protagonists like Curtis Yarvin, Richard Hanania, and Stephen Miller. They’re too wound up in their own neurotic mind-palaces to be reached by anything material; they’ll feel the same mix of absolute self-worship and self-loathing in any economy. As with any binary there are plenty of people who fall outside, and anti-fascism has to reckon with how to prevent low-information, low-engagement voters (and as is often the case, their teenage sons) becoming creeps who delight at gore videos and weep at the Aryan beauty of Malfoid fanfics.
The recent midterm election results would seem to support the idea that there is a split between casual and hardcore authoritarians in the US, and likely the rest of the world, and that this split can be exploited during times of economic uncertainty for progressive ends. If there is a mass of low-information, low-engagement voters that can be moved solely by the prices they see at the checkout, and if this mass is large enough to be able to stymie fascist ambitions, which seems to be the message that the midterms are sending, then Weber is vindicated. JD Vance certainly seems to think so. However, I think that it may be premature to declare total anti-fascist economics victory just yet. There are deeper and darker currents in the right wing mind.
When writing The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama believed he was looking at an indefinite period of liberal democratic hegemony. This would secure the human need for isothymos, the desire to be equal to one’s peers. The Civil Rights Movement was essentially an isothymic movement, innately bound up in a demand for dignity that appears often in Weber’s work.
There is another impulse however: megalothymia, the desire to be elevated above one’s peers. The literature of fascism is filled with a few promises of economic restoration and a great deal of racism, but both are outweighed by a seething hatred of ‘the masses.’ The fear of social atomisation that Arendt would highlight as the beginning of contracting the fascist virus is just one level. Even if you could recreate pre-modern close-knit communities, most fascists would not want to live in them unless they were part of a strict hierarchy that placed them above and beyond their peers. We see this even in the homes of reactionaries: when fascist men get what they say they want—a beautiful home maintained by a submissive wife backed by material abundance—they are inevitably miserable and make it everyone’s problem. Even what little equality there is between them and their tradwives is intolerable to them. Their desire is to exist as Schmitt’s Sovereign rather than as a member of a functioning society.
The most toxic elements of the Fascist International are explicitly or implicitly Nietzschean, so the promise of Universal Basic Services or dignified, unionised labour is actively repellent to them. They would see anti-fascist economics as anti-human, making well-fed and comfortable domestic animals out of what should be wolves. They could easily portray living on UBS as opposed to being a start-up founder, content creator, online gambler or crypto investor as effeminate parasitism, and given how much gender figures into the current financial nihilist moment they would have an easy time. A figure like Musk and a platform like X can manipulate a person’s desires to the point that they embrace these post-materialist ideas. To the fascist, whether the economy is good or bad is irrelevant.
My fear when reading Anti-Fascist Economics is that in looking back at the fascist states of the 20th century, many of which were unambiguously the result of weaponised economic dissatisfaction, we may miss what is unique about our current situation. In short, people are different now. We are not workers, petit-bourgeois or even the masses—but consumers and personal brands. Our engagement with politics is often as digitally-mediated online fandoms. Economics, as Thatcher said, is the means to change the soul, and people raised in neoliberal economies are going to be profoundly different to those raised in pre-hyperpolitics 1930s Germany and Italy. Fascism has changed accordingly, turning up the emphasis on its libidinal, affective elements, turning itself into a vast assemblage of content production and consumption within the liberal state rather than a potential replacement for it. It’s possible that the next fascism won’t be driven by a desire for economic security but as a rebellion against it in favour of a crueller, more passionate world.
This is not, in any way, an argument against implementing Weber’s ideas or rejecting her analysis. If there was a button I could push to see her ideas enacted I would press it; put them on a ballot and I will vote for it. I would do so in the hope that it would bleed off enough of the casual authoritarians to prevent another Trump or to stave off a possible Farage or Tice government, leaving the fascist movement as a social club for a few maladjusted freaks rather than a political force. That may be too hopeful. It may be the case that so many people have been alienated from reality and disillusioned with the promise of a dignified existence that the pleasures fascism promises are the only thing that seems real. We should not let a single midterm victory go to our heads. We cannot be complacent about the fascist potential within democracies, nor can we be complacent about the fascist desires that the real world cannot satisfy.
Featured image is "UNCTAD60 Global Leaders Forum 14 June 2024," CC BY-SA 2.0 UNCTAD 2024.
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