Postliberalism Fails for a Reason

Postliberal orders fail because they cannot meet the material and moral needs of their citizens.

Postliberalism Fails for a Reason

Ever since no less a liberal icon than Barack Obama put Why Liberalism Failed on his reading list, American postliberalism has seemed on the rise. For many on the right, postliberalism has been an intellectually liberating phenomena, giving systematic expression to their longstanding and instinctive feeling that something is very wrong with liberal democracy. Even to postliberalism’s many naysayers, myself very much included, self-described postliberal JD Vance rising to a heartbeat away from the Presidency showcased its ascendancy. Even if that augured little good. 

This makes the arrival of a new book declaring that in fact it is postliberalism that has failed surprising. James Patterson and Thomas Howe’s Why Postliberalism Failed joins a growing chorus of criticisms, such as notably swell new books by Matt Sleat and Paul Kelly, that take aim at the upstarts. While Sleat and Kelly are critical of postliberals from a more center-left perspective, drawing on Charles Taylor and John Rawls, Patterson and Howe offer reasons to reject postliberalism from the center-right. Citing influences like Kevin Vallier, Friedrich Hayek, and Pope John Paul II they make the case for why American conservatives abandoning their commitment to ordered liberty—a relatively unalloyed capitalism and moderate social conservatism—was a disastrous mistake.

By and large their arrows hit the target, and Why Postliberalism Failed is an often fascinating and historically grounded rebuttal of the titular ideology. Liberals everywhere will profit from reading their timely book. But Patterson and Howe’s own nostalgia for an earlier and less extreme conservatism should be rejected by liberals. Indeed many of the sharp objections they apply to postliberals ought to be applied to explain why center-right liberalism failed, is still failing, and justly ought to fail. 

Back to the 1980s? 

The weakest part of the book is without a doubt the foreword by economist Catherine Ruth Pakaluk. Pakaluk is an unabashed Reaganite, insisting that the only reason to be critical of the Reagan administration was “Reagan had not liberalized enough.” She describes leaving a conservative conference (when and where she leaves deliberately vague) with the “uneasy feeling that the tradition of conservatism with which I most closely aligned—the conservatism of Russell Kirk and Winston Churchill, of limited government, ordered liberty, and the free association of families and communities—was being summoned to the guillotine” (p. xii). Later Pakaluk very bizarrely describes the postliberal’s “characteristic intellectual move” as “Hegelian” in presenting a story of “progressive historical necessity. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis.” She asserts that the postliberals “dress Hegel in a Dominican habit and call it tradition. It is no accident that Carl Schmitt—a Nazi party member, but more to the point, a theorist who made the political the foundational category of human life—has become something of a patron saint for the movement” (p. xiii). 

Theoretically Pakaluk’s commentary is all over the place. Her description of the postliberal method as “Hegelian” is baffling for a number of reasons (p. xiii). Firstly, it's just wrong. I’ve very rarely seen the postliberals even reference Hegel. Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed references Hegel exactly once—to criticize the kinds of arguments about historical inevitability Hegelian philosophy tended to generate. In other words, one of the central postliberals rejects just the kind of stories about “progressive historical necessity” Pakaluk thinks are characteristic of postliberal thought. Moreover, the attribution to Hegel of the earlier philosopher Fichte’s method of thesis-antithesis-synthesis is an old mistake no one should be making anymore. Pakaluk is misattributing ideas to the postliberals whose origin she misattributes to Hegel. The attempt to link Schmitt to this is all the more insulting. Schmitt triumphantly quipped that Hitler’s election was the “day Hegel died” in Germany, since the idea of a rational, neutral state was dissolving before fascist decisionism and irrationalism. 

Even Pakaluk’s regard for the good old days of the liberal right is rosy-eyed. It’d be unfair to call Russell Kirk an illiberal proto-Trumpian. Had he lived until 2016 I suspect Kirk would have echoed Roger Scruton in finding Trump’s vulgarity too much to stomach. But Kirk was notably suspicious of the liberalism Pakaluk advertises. In the closing chapter of The Conservative Mind Kirk approvingly cites Malcolm Muggeridge’s quip that liberalism was a “death wish” and panted at its “slide down to dusty death” under pressure from the far left and right during the 1960s. Kirk even got into a famous debate with fusionist Frank Meyer who argued liberal freedom and the conservative emphasis on virtue could be reconciled. Unsurprisingly Kirk has been cited by postliberal philosophers like Patrick Deneen and R. R. Reno; they applaud Kirk’s emphasis on traditionalist “order” over the disorder offered by both progressivism and the old conservative movement’s emphasis on “freedom.”  

I’ve spent an unusual amount of time on Pakaluk’s foreword because it exemplifies many of the problems that pervade center-right contemporary analyses of postliberalism: the casual elisions, the whitewashing of yesteryear’s conservatism, the yearning to lump a fundamentally right-wing phenomena with the Hegelian collectivist bogeymen of yestercentury, et cetera. 

These tendencies are less severe in the main text by Patterson and Howes, but they still bubble up occasionally. Throughout their book they chide postliberals for being nostalgic for pre-liberal and anti-liberal orders while ignoring their enormous flaws. Referencing the Dutch historian F. R. Ankersmit, they refer to the concept of “‘sublime historical experience’ in which a person falls in love with an imagined past and then attempts to reconstruct it in the present and to live within it” (p. 219).

Pre- and anti-liberal orders lost legitimacy and fell apart because they failed to meet the material and moral needs of their citizens. But when Patterson and Howes express resentment over how postliberals launched a “kind of elite coup of political conservatism in America and abroad for the past decade, one enabled by the surprising inability of more established conservatives to meet new political realities with any sense of urgency or originality” they fall into the tendency Ankersmit describes (p. 4). The insinuation that the rise of reaction is down to the “patronage of figures like Orbán” is ironic when you consider how center-right think tanks and outlets were long lavished with money by grateful wealthy benefactors…and still couldn’t retain their grip on the right (p. 4). If right-wing liberalism has by now largely been rejected by the mass of conservatives (and Democrats for that matter), it isn’t clear to me why nostalgia for its heyday doesn’t constitute an unwillingness to wrestle seriously with why it failed. Theirs is a nostalgia for the good old days of Bush condemnations of the “reality-based community” and Reagan propping up tinpot right-wing dictators that parallels the postliberals’ saccharine yearning for the medieval yesteryear. Recreating a Neverland of the 1980s isn’t a viable option in 2026. 

A core problem is that the book doesn’t ask why the base of the American conservative movement was so open to—willing and even excited for—a takeover by an illiberal right. If it was the case that the Reaganites and Bushites, the latter of whom oversaw America imprison more people than the Soviet Union or apartheid South Africa, and the former of which initiated illegal wars that led to torture and death on a mass scale, were so deeply committed to liberal freedom, then why have their successors been so eager to trash the liberal freedoms of millions? The reality is that, as historians from Dave Austin Walsh to John S. Huntington have shown, illiberalism has always been a major force on the American right. As a good friend of mine memorably put it, the illiberal right was always welcome in the conservative movement’s car. It’s just swapped chilling in the back for being in the driver’s seat. 

A history of postliberal failures 

Fortunately these limitations don’t seriously hamper Patterson and Howe’s deep dive into the problems with postliberal theory and practice. By now many smart people have offered probing critiques of the postliberal right’s philosophy and alignment with the Trump administration and other regimes. What Patterson and Howe offer that is original and fresh is an extensive chronicle of reactionary thought and regimes. Given that that is where the major contribution of the book lies, I’ll focus most of the rest of this review on it.

In the early chapters Patterson and Howe introduce readers to the theoretical history of the illiberal right. This goes back to the heyday of the French Revolution, when arch-reactionaries like Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald railed against the “Satanic” spread of republicanism and liberalism. These reactionaries insisted that the liberal “demand for liberty is a demand for vice” (p. 74). To their mind the authoritarian throne-and-altar systems of the ancien regime were the only legitimate system, ordained providentially by God himself. They conceived the role of the reactionary political thinkers as “hunt[ing] down the enemies of throne and altar and expos[ing] them to public judgement or a kind of political inquisition,” (p. 75). These can seem like radical gestures, not “conservative” ones. But they were clearly right-wing forms of radicalism, described by reactionaries as the restoration of a virtuous hierarchical order that liberals had viciously destroyed.

Patterson and Howe’s main focus is on the conspiratorial and monological explanations at the core of many of these authors’ thought. For many earlier reactionaries it’s a combination of intellectuals, Jews, Freemasons and more who conspired to undermine a precious, harmonious social order. Carl Schmitt, the fascist jurist and major influence on figures like Adrian Vermeule, denounced the “Jewish spirit” pervading Germany for contributing to its slide into liberalism, socialism, and materialism. Patterson and Howe argue that this conspiratorial mode of analysis is a trend that continues to this day, when postliberals lump every major social problem together and insinuate that liberalism is to blame for all of them. Today’s postliberals typically attack a corrupt media system, elites overeducated at coastal schools, and even altruistic entrepreneurs like It’s a Wonderful Life’s George Bailey for undermining previously traditional, conservative societies. While some postliberals are quick to repudiate the older far right’s antisemitism and racism, that doesn’t inoculate them against uncritically referring to figures like Schmitt or the proto-fascist Charles Maurras. 

Patterson and Howe’s analysis of far-right intellectuals could be deeper, which would in turn better explain how they are able to appeal to many. As the fierce critic of the far right Ronald Beiner notes in his seminal Civil Religion, the “deepest objection” reactionaries like de Maistre make “to liberalism as a way of life is its deliberately nonheroic or anti-heroic attitude to life, its banalization of the problem of human existence” (p. 304). Liberals need a considered answer to this perennial objection. But Patterson and Howe are no doubt right to stress that it is no accident that the far right’s argumentative modus operandi is to descend into agonism and thence into conspiracy theorizing. 

Agonism refers to the view that conflict within politics is not an ill to be transcended the way liberals think it can be overcome through deliberation and reasoned debate. Instead it is an existential feature of politics, which is fundamentally a contest between incompatible worldviews (political theologies, in Schmitt’s famous phrase). Some reactionary and fascist thinkers went even further and framed agonism not only as inevitable but inherently elevating: the struggle of a patriotic, pure and virtuous people against corrupt decadence creeping in under the influence of infectious liberalism and leftism. 

I’d posit that the historical nostalgia Patterson and Howe foreground is part of the explanation as to why the right is so often attracted to these kinds of agonistic politics. Reactionaries refuse to see that the hierarchical and authoritarian regimes they lionize collapsed because they were structurally incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic material and moral needs. To negate this unacceptable possibility, reactionaries have to project blame onto shadowy antagonists who corrupted otherwise docile and content subjects, turning them into discontented and animated citizens. Intellectuals are a common target, as are minorities, socialists, and countless others.

Another part of the appeal is the way this agonistic politics dovetails with the hierarchical and anti-egalitarian instincts that attract many to the reactionary right in the first place. An animating passion of the far right has long been their strange view that the worthy strong have been oppressed and overcome by the undeserving weak. This potent emotional combination of feeling oneself a superior and a victim simultaneously is what drives many people towards reactionary positions. It is also why the enemies of the far right are often presented as simultaneously too weak to deserve to rule and oppressively strong. While this may be logically difficult, it satisfies both horns of the ideological framing. An agonistic politics that paints reactionaries as heroic warriors struggling against decadent and effeminate forces supports the fantasy of being an elevated Man of History.

One of the truly excellent contributions of Patterson and Howe’s book is how it comprehensively shows this is not just a form of theoretical narrowness characteristic of reactionary thinking. These theoretical flaws flow into their failed political projects. Put into practice, their illiberal efforts have failed time and again. In the book’s two most substantial chapters, Patterson and Howe chronicle the attempt to construct postliberal integralist, authoritarian, and quasi-fascist regimes in countries from Spain and Brazil to Austria and Hungary. Far from offering a solution to the “banalization of the problem of human existence” through a new embodiment of virtue, various “postliberal” regimes like Salazar’s Portugal and Orbán’s Hungary brought misery to thousands while indulging in corruption on a truly decadent scale (p. 304). 

Many of these regimes were far worse than Orbán’s miserable oligarchy. Patterson and Howe note the disturbing tendency on the contemporary right to wax poetic about the virtues of Franco’s Spain (itself a longstanding tendency amongst American conservatives like William Buckley), all while ignoring that to “secure his position atop the Spanish State, Franco continued the White Terror in which he killed, according to Paul Preston, 180,000 additional Spaniards” (pp. 175–176). As sociologist Michael Mann notes in Fascists, Franco’s fury towards leftists especially was so unremitting it even shocked Heinrich Himmler. Confronting Spanish prisons overflowing with leftists, Himmler recommended Franco reincorporate them into the workforce. He was denied. Mann chillingly notes that Himmler “did not seem to realize that working class militants were to Franco what Jews were to himself. Franco was to refuse Hitler’s and Himmler’s repeated requests to hand over Spanish Jews, but toward leftists he was merciless” (p. 344). Lest one think this is all in the past, Patterson and Howe cite how Adrian Vermeule called “Francisco Franco’s Spain the 'Good Society' for putting old socialists and communists to work on roads and in the fields” (p. 221). When you contrast this blase attitude to Mann’s anecdote the comparison is chilling. 

Conclusion 

Patterson and Howe’s Why Postliberalism Failed is a meticulous and well-written critique of its subject matter from two authors who know postliberalism and its figures well. There is a very personal quality to much of this. Patterson and Howe clearly resent seeing what the conservative movement they came up in has become. That nostalgia is misplaced. It was centrist figures who oversaw centrism’s collapse, and they will not save us from what has emerged from that wreckage. Nevertheless Patterson and Howe’s fiery denunciation of postliberalism is an inspiring sign that the center-right is committed to countering the rising wave of right-wing radicalism in the United States. Their book ought to be read widely and taken seriously. 


Featured image is "Francisco Franco, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y el cardenal Eustaquio Ilundáin y Esteban," author anonymous, 1937.

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